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Abstract 
 
 In this work, we propose a quantum bit string commitment protocol using 
polarization of mesoscopic coherent states. The protocol is described and its security 
against brute force and quantum cloning machine attack is analyzed.  
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Bit commitment is one of the most important cryptographic protocols that can be 
used to realize, among others, coin tossing, zero-knowledge proofs and electronic voting. 
Due to its importance, it was one of the firsts cryptographic protocols that researchers 
tried to find a quantum version [1-4], believing that a quantum bit commitment (QBC) 
protocol could be unconditionally secure. However, it was proved that it is impossible to 
construct an unconditionally secure QBC protocol using qubits encoded in single-photon 
pulses [5,6], that is, when Alice sends a single-photon to Bob. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that QBC has security similar to classical versions. In fact, limiting the power of 
the participants, it is possible to construct QBC protocols resistant to some types of 
attacks [7,8]. 
On the other hand, aiming to improve the performance of practical quantum 
communication systems (limited by the use of single-photons that are hard to produce, 
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detect and survive to the channel losses), the use of polarization of mesoscopic coherent 
states (MCS) as quantum information has been proposed [9-15]. In fact, the proposed 
quantum key expansion protocols using MCS can provide high transmission rates over 
long distances; however, its security has been a point of intense discussions [16-19].  
In this direction, this work proposes a quantum bit string commitment protocol 
using polarization of mesoscopic coherent states (QBSC_MCS). As will be seen, the 
proposed protocol has all the advantages of using coherent states instead of single-photon 
pulses and it has not the security problems of the quantum key expansion protocols 
proposed in [9-15] since it is not necessary that Alice and Bob share an initial key in 
advance. 
The n-bit string commitment protocol can be shortly described in the following 
way: Alice has to choose one between (at maximum) 2n bit strings. She has to convince 
Bob that she did her choice, at the same time she is not allowed to change her mind and 
Bob is not allowed to know Alice’s choice without her permission. The proposed 
protocol can be understood observing Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Quantum bit string commitment protocol: (a) distribution of polarization states 
and (b) polarization measurement setup. SPD – single-photon detector, PBS – Polarization 
beam splitter. 
(a) (b) 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, there are M polarization states and, hence, the bit string has 
log2(M) bits. Supposing honest Alice and Bob, the QBSC_MCS can be described as 
follows: 1) Alice chooses one of the M polarization states and sends it to Bob using 
coherent states. 2) Bob, which is supposed to have a quantum memory, waits Alice to 
reveal her choice. Having this information, Bob performs a measurement of the 
polarization using the appropriate basis in order to confirm Alice’s choice. Now, 
supposing real Alice and Bob, some cares must be taken into account in order to avoid 
one of them cheating the other.  
In order to do not be cheated by Alice, Bob limits the minimal mean photon 
number that Alice can use. For this, in his measurement setup, shown in Fig. 1(b), Bob 
uses a non-single-photon detector at the output where the photons are expected to emerge 
(once Alice revealed the polarization, Bob sets the polarization rotator in order to 
transform the state sent by Alice in a horizontal polarization state) and he uses a single-
photon detector at the other output. In the ideal case, if detection occurs in the single-
photon detector, Bob will know that Alice lied about her choice. Once Bob will confirm 
Alice’s choice measuring the polarization with non-single-photon detector, Alice will be 
forced to use multi-photon pulses. On one hand, Bob limits the minimal mean photon 
number of the coherent state used in order to avoid Alice to choose one polarization and, 
at the end, to change her choice to one of the neighbors. On the other hand, Alice will use 
the minimal mean photon number permitted, otherwise, if Bob has enough photons, he 
can use the brute-force attack to determine Alice’s choice without her permission.  
Those non-cheating statements can be mathematically described. The inner 
product between two neighbors polarization is given by:  
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In (1), without loss of generality, we have used the two-mode coherent state , with   
and  real numbers. Thus, we are considering only linear polarizations. In order to 
analyze the security, initially we consider the parameter, 1sr  given by:  
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In (3) we have used n=2+2 and =/(2M). Thus, 1sr  shows the amount that two 
neighbors polarizations fails to be orthogonal. Since M is a given parameter of the 
protocol, Alice and Bob agree in a value for 1sr  and, using (3), they find the mean photon 
number to be used. Bob sets his optical receiver to have a good signal-noise relation with 
optical pulses having mean photon number equal to n because this is the minimal mean 
photon number that Alice must use.  
 In order to check the security against some attacks, let us consider the brute-force 
attack and the quantum cloning machine attack. In the first case, Bob splits the pulse sent 
by Alice in M pulses having mean photon number equal to n/M, and he tests each pulse 
in a different polarization basis, now using single-photon detectors in both PBS’s output. 
(4) 
, 
, 0
1, 0
,0
M

0, 1
0,
0,
M

1,  
,
M
  
 
 
Fig. 2 – Quantum cloning of the polarization of coherent states. 
The probability of Bob to identify the polarization sent by Alice, without any doubt 
(detection in both detectors for all basis different of the correct one), is given by: 
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In (4) k is the polarization state chosen by Alice and PA(k) is the probability of k to be 
chosen by Alice.  
On the other hand, in the quantum cloning machine attack, Bob splits the pulse 
sent by Alice in N (1$N$M-1) pulses and he uses a quantum cloning machine of coherent 
states (QCM_CS) [20-26] to produce M copies. In order to make the cloning, Bob firstly 
separates the horizontal and vertical components using a PBS and he clones each 
component separately. After, he joints the components again to obtain the clones of the 
polarization state. The process, for 1%M cloning machine, is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fidelity of the Gaussian cloning of coherent states does not depend on the mean 
photon number and it is given by MN/(MN+M-N) [20]. Since the cloning of the 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
polarization requires the cloning of the two components, the fidelity of the polarization 
cloning is given by [MN/(MN+M-N)]2. In order to the quantum cloning attack to be 
useful, it is necessary that the fidelity of the clones must be at least larger than the fidelity 
between one state and the state halfway between two neighbor polarizations. Therefore, 
the security condition against QCM_CS attack is: 
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In (5) ’,’ is the clone of ,. In (6) we consider that Bob can produce M copies 
using the state sent by Alice or, he can divide the pulse sent by Alice in N states having 
mean photon number n/N and using them to produce M copies. Hence, in order to 
obtain security, (6) must be satisfied for all N inside the interval 1$N$M-1.  
 At last, the probability of Alice cheating Bob telling him that she choose one of 
the neighbors of the polarization in fact chosen is given by: 
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In (7), * is the quantum efficiency of Bob’s non-single-photon detector. In the Table 1, 
considering PA (equation (4)) uniformly distributed, *=0.75 and 1sr =0.5, it is shown the 
values of n, pa, pb and the security condition against QCM_CS attack for the firsts 12 
values of M. In particular, the last column of Table 1 receives the value ‘1’ if (6) is 
satisfied for all values of N and ‘0’ if not.  
 
M n pa (%) pb (%) Eq. (7) * 
2 1.183 19.832 2.928 1 
3 2.586 40.153 0.492 1 
4 4.552 48.552 0.116 1 
5 7.081 50.438 0.034 1 
6 10.171 50.552 0.012 1 
7 13.823 50.433 0.005 1 
8 18.036 50.333 0.002 1 
9 22.812 50.263 0.0008 1 
10 28.150 50.213 0.0004 1 
11 34.049 50.176 0.0002 1 
12 40.510 50.148 0.0001 0 
 
 
 
 
Observing Table 1, one can see that the proposed protocol is secure against QCM-CS 
attack only for M<12. Moreover, the larger the value of M the lower the probability of 
Bob cheating Alice. On the other hand, the probability of Alice cheating Bob, equation 
(8), tends to 50%. If 1sr  decreases (increase), neighbors polarizations become more (less) 
orthogonal, pa also decreases (increase) but the QCM_CS attack becomes more (less) 
effective, for example, if 1sr =0.1, only the situations where M<4 are secure. 
 
Conclusions  
 
 We have proposed the use of the polarization of mesoscopic coherent states to 
realize a bit string commitment protocol. It has been shown that, for M<12 and PA 
Table 1 – Values of n, pa, pb and the security condition against QCM_CS attack for the 
firsts 12 values of M. * Value ‘1’(‘0’) means that equation (6) is (not) satisfied for all N in 
the interval [1,M-1]. PA uniformly distributed, *=0.75 and 1sr =0.5. 
uniformly distributed, *=0.75 and 1sr =0.5, the protocol is resistant against brute force and 
quantum clone machine attacks realized by Bob. On the other hand, Alice can cheat Bob 
with probability close to 50% for M&4. This is a more secure situation than that found in 
QBC protocols based on single-photon pulses where Alice can cheat Bob with very high 
probability.   
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